1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 INCEPTION GROUP REAL ESTATE LLC, a 8 Washington limited liability company, 9 Plaintiff, CASE NO. C09-0810-JCC 10 v. ORDER 11 AMIGA INC., a Delaware corporation formerly known as KMOS Inc., 12 Defendant. 13 14 15 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. No. 6). The 16 Court has carefully considered the motion and the balance of relevant materials in the case file, and has 17 determined that oral argument is not necessary. The Court hereby finds and rules as follows. 18 I. **BACKGROUND & FACTS** 19 In this diversity action, Plaintiff alleges the following. In November 2003, the King County 20 Superior Court awarded Plaintiff a judgment against Amino, Inc., in the amount of \$147,476.87, plus 21 interest at the statutory rate. (Compl. ¶ 5 (Dkt. No. 1 at 2).) In November 2008, Plaintiff entered a 22 written agreement with Amino, Inc., and Defendant Amiga, Inc., in which Plaintiff agreed to accept 23 \$150,000 as full satisfaction of the judgment, so long as Plaintiff received that amount within ninety 24 days of the effective date of the agreement. (Agreement Regarding Payment of Judgment ¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 1

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at 5).) In addition, Defendant Amiga, Inc., promised that it "unconditionally guarantee[d] payment of \$150,0000 [sic] of the Judgment." (Id. ¶ 5.) The contract provided that in the event of any action to enforce it, "the substantially prevailing party shall recover all costs and expenses thereof, including reasonable attorney's fees from the losing party." (Id. ¶ 8.)

According to the Complaint, Amino, Inc., has not paid any portion of the judgment to date. (Comp. ¶ 9 (Dkt. No. 1 at 2).) Nor has Defendant Amiga, Inc., paid any portion of the \$150,000 amount of the judgment that it guaranteed. (*Id.* ¶ 10.) Plaintiff initiated this action on June 12, 2009, seeking to collect damages from Defendant Amiga, Inc., for breach of contract in the amount of \$150,000. (*Id.* ¶ 11.) In addition, Plaintiff sought prejudgment interest at the statutory rate of 12% from February 17, 2009. (*Id.*) Plaintiff also sought the sum of \$10,000 in a reasonable attorney's fee. (*Id.* ¶ 12.) Defendant did not timely appear in the action, and on July 13, 2009, the Clerk of Court entered an order of default. (Dkt. No. 9.)

In the instant motion for default judgment, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter a default judgment in the amount of \$167,052.05, consisting of the principal amount of the guaranty of \$150,000; prejudgment interest in the amount of \$7,052.05; and an attorneys' fee of \$10,000, "in the event this action is contested." (Mot. 1–2 (Dkt. No. 6).) The Court will address each of these requests, below.

#### II. DISCUSSION

# A. Default Judgments

The decision whether to enter a default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) rests within the Court's discretion. *Eitel v. McCool*, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). "The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true." *TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal*, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987) (*quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Group*, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977)).

## **B.** The Guaranty of \$150,000

The signed agreement expressly states that Defendant unconditionally guaranteed payment of  $\label{eq:order} \text{ORDER} - 2$ 

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\$150,000 of the judgment. (Agreement ¶ 5 (Dkt. No. 1 at 5).) Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment in the amount of \$150,000.

## C. Prejudgment Interest

Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to \$7,052.05 in prejudgment interest, incurred from February 17, 2009, to July 10, 2009, at the statutory rate of 12% per annum. (Mot. ¶ 3 (Dkt. No. 6); Compl. ¶ 11 (Dkt. No. 1).) "As a general rule, '[i]n diversity actions, state law determines the rate of prejudgment interest[.]" Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting AT&T Co. v. United Computer Sys., Inc., 98 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 1996)). Under Washington law, "prejudgment interest is allowed in civil litigation at the statutory interest rate, RCW 4.56.110, RCW 19.52.020, when a party to the litigation retains funds rightfully belonging to another and the amount of the funds at issue is liquidated, that is, the amount at issue can be calculated with precision and without reliance on opinion or discretion." Crest Inc. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 115 P.3d 349, 357 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 649 (Wash. 1998)). "The award of prejudgment interest is based on the public policy that a person retaining money belonging to another should pay interest in that sum to compensate for the loss of the money's 'use value.'" Buckner, Inc. v. Berkey Irrigation Supply, 951 P.2d 338, 344 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). Where "no different rate is agreed to in writing between the parties," the statutory rate of interest for every loan or forbearance of money shall bear interest at the rate of twelve percent per annum. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.010(1). Additionally, "[p]rejudgment interest accrues from the date the claim arose to the date of judgment." Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Wash. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 972 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).

The Court finds that the sum owed to Plaintiff was explicit in the agreement and therefore could be calculated with precision and without reliance on opinion or discretion. The agreement did not specify a different prejudgment interest rate than the statutory rate. Accordingly, the Court awards Plaintiff prejudgment interest at the statutory rate of 12% per annum on the principal amount of \$150,000, accruing from the date the payment became due, February 17, 2009, until July 10, 2009, as

requested.

## D. Attorneys' Fees

Plaintiff requests attorneys' fees in the amount of \$10,000, "in the event this action is contested." (Mot. ¶ 4 (Dkt. No. 6); Feinberg Decl. ¶ 6 (Dkt. No. 8 at 2).) The Court believes Plaintiff may have intended to request this amount in the event the action was *not* contested. (*See* Compl. ¶ 12 (Dkt. No. 1).) The agreement does provide that in the event of any action to enforce the agreement, "the substantially prevailing party shall recover all costs and expenses thereof, including reasonable attorney's fees from the losing party." (Agreement ¶ 8 (Dkt. No. 1 at 7).) Therefore, it would seem that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees. However, Plaintiff has submitted no documentation or breakdown whatsoever to support the amount it requests as reasonable attorneys' fees. Therefore, the Court has no basis upon which to award them and declines to do so at present under these circumstances. If the Court is correct that Plaintiff seeks attorneys' fees in in its motion for a default judgment in the amount of \$10,000, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file, within thirty days of the date of this Order, appropriate documentation to support its fee request so that the Court may review this request for reasonableness.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. No. 6). The Court awards Plaintiff the following amounts:

(1) Damages for breach of contract: \$150,000.00

(2) Prejudgment interest: \$ 7,052.05

(3) Attorneys' Fees \$ 0

TOTAL: \$157,052.05

The Court may revise this default judgment as to attorneys' fees, based upon further supplementation of

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the record by Plaintiff.

DATED this 27th day of July, 2009.

1 C. Coylera

John C. Coughenour UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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